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NOTES
LAND SUBDIVISION REGULATION: ITS EFFECTS AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The American postwar phenomenon of mass migration to
suburbia has generated costly demands for public improvements.
Specifically, the shifting population has created the need for
facilities such as roads, sewers, schools and parks. This demand
has caused a critical drain on the funds available to the affected
communities. Municipal governments have long sought the means
of providing for the new facilities necessitated by the newcomers
without overburdening the established residents. The method
most commonly used is to require the subdivider to dedicate a
portion of his land, or its equivalent value, to the municipality
as a condition precedent to the approval of his plat. This, in turn,
shifts a portion of the cost generated by land development to
the new residents in the form of increased housing costs. This
note deals with the effects of land subdivision regulation and
its constitutionality.
The Traditional Exactions
The practice of having new residents contribute to the
expenses they generate originated in the real estate boom in
the first quarter of this century. Many municipalities realized
the need for effective subdivision control after finding them-
selves with the burden of paying for new streets and utility
improvements which serviced only vacant lots." However, many
states had anticipated this need and equipped municipalities with
the authority to require subdividers to provide specific public
improvements. This subdivision regulation has been sustained
in a number of state court decisions. For example, in Allen v.
Stockwell,2 the Michigan Supreme Court sustained an ordinance
requiring the subdivider to provide graded and graveled streets,
surface drains, sidewalks and sanitary sewers, as a reasonable
exercise of authorized municipal and police power. In Ridgefield
Land Co. v. City of Detroit, the same court found the city em-
'The improvements were made in anticipation of development which did
not take place. Reps, Control Of Land Subdivision By Municipal Planning
Boards, 40 CoRNL L.Q. 258, 266 (1955).
2 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920).
8 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
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powered to condition approval of a plat upon the establishment
of a ten-foot building line on one street. The court also
upheld the required dedication of seventeen feet for a second
street, in addition to the normal thirty-foot dedication. The sub-
divider maintained that the ordinance was, in effect, a taking of
his private property for public use without just compensation.
The court rejected this argument, maintaining that the city was
not attempting to compel a dedication, but rather, was acting
within its power by imposing reasonable conditions to be complied
with before the plat is accepted for record. "In theory at least,
the owner of a subdivision voluntarily dedicates sufficient land
for streets in return for the advantage and privilege of having
his plat recorded." 4  A second basis for the decision was the
city's determination that widened streets were necessary for ac-
commodating traffic, and, hence, the required dedication was
within the municipality's police power.6
The "Taking" Argument
Although the courts have accepted the police power basis
for the enactment of subdivision control regulation,6 the question
often arises as to whether a specific application subjects the sub-
divider to reasonable regulations, or so limits his activity by
conditions as to amount to a taking of his property without
compensation. In the earlier street dedication cases, the courts
uniformly rejected this "taking" argument.7  In Brous v. Smith,"
a town building and zoning inspector refused a permit to a
subdivider who failed to construct roads providing free access
to proposed structures, or post a bond to insure performance
after erection of the buildings. The court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the challenged enabling act,9 stating that "'to
challenge the power to give proper direction to community growth
and development . . . is to deny the vitality of a principle that
has brought men together in organized society for their mutual
4Id. at 472, 217 N.W. at 59.5 As the court stated in the leading case of Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v.
West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 150, 198 Atl. 225, 229 (1938): "The public
welfare is of prime importance; and the correlative restrictions upon
individual rights-either of persons or of property-are incidents of the
social order, considered a negligible loss compared with the resultant advan-
tages to the community as a whole."
4 Cunningham, Land-Use Control--The State and Local Programs, 50
IowA L. REv. 367, 416 (1965).
7 Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality Of Imposing Increased Cow-
reunity Costs On New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions,
73 YAir L.J. 1118, 1130 (1964).
8 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E2d 503 (1952).
9 N.Y. Tow LA w § 280(a).
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advantage.' "10 The court found the provisions reasonable in
light of the importance of access to the proposed dwellings, par-
ticularly in times of emergency. While it was not made clear
why the burden of paying for the new streets should fall upon
the subdivider, the court implied that since the subdivider had
created these needs by attracting newcomers to the community,
he should pay the bill. Furthermore, since the demand for new
facilities was due to causes external to the existing community,
it would be unfair to burden the established residents with their
cost.1 Thus the "taking" objection lacks merit as long as there
is a reasonable relation between the condition imposed on a land-
use and the need which that land-use will normally generate.
In Ayres v. City Council 2 the court rejected the defendant's
contention that the conditions imposed on approval of his sub-
division plan amounted to a taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. The planning commission had
imposed certain conditions precedent to approval of the sub-
divider's plat, including the dedication of part of the subdivision
for the widening of streets. The court stated that there was no
sufficient reason to justify overturning the trial court's decision
that the conditions were "reasonably related to increased traffic
and other needs of the proposed subdivision. . . ."13 Here
again, the court did not specifically state why the conditions did
not constitute a "taking," but it declared that control require-
ments should be reasonably related to the subdivision in question.
Incidental benefit to the community as a whole was not controlling.
Thus, while the courts have not formulated a definite test for
determining when an exaction for streets or sewers will amount
to a "taking," they have not rejected the imposition of the
traditional conditions upon the subdivider.
The Modern Exactions: Land for Schools and Parks
The major issues in this area now focus on municipal de-
mands for land dedication for school and park sites, or cash in
lieu of land for the improvement of sites. The basic question
is whether the subdivider or the new resident will be paying for
more than a fair portion of the total cost of these schools and
parks. If they are burdened with an unfair share of the cost,
the exaction may be considered both discriminatory and an
unlawful taking.
1OBrous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 168-69, 106 N.E.2d 503, 505 (195z),
quoting from Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. West Orange, supra note 5, at
150-51, 198 Atl. at 229.
11 Brous v. Smith, supra note 10, at 169, 106 N.E.2d at 506.
12 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
'3 Id. at 42, 207 P.2d at 8.
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"The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
secures equality of right by forbidding arbitrary discrimination
between persons similarly circumstanced." 14 Thus, it requires that
the landowners of a given area be treated similarly. If the new-
comers are taxed to pay costs which are the product of the entire
community's activities, they are being treated dissimilarly from
others "similarly circumstanced," since they are being required
to pay more than others receiving the identical benefits.' 5
In the majority of recent cases striking down municipal
exactions, the courts never reached the constitutional issue raised
by such exactions.' 6  In these cases, the municipal provisions
were struck down as ultra vires, i.e., beyond the statutory powers
provided by the state legislatures. However, where statutory
authority was present and the courts were forced to confront
the constitutional issue, some have not hesitated to strike down
the ordinance or statute as unconstitutional.
Land - Cash Exactions Held Unconstitutional
In Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,17
the town planning board conditioned approval of plaintiff's plat
upon the dedication of land for a school and park site.' The
Illinois court overruled the town board because the record did
not establish that the need for the educational and recreational
facilities was one specifically attributable to the addition of the
subdivision. To support the decision, the court looked to the test
formulated in the earlier case of Rosen v. Village of Downers
Grove.' 9 That court, holding invalid a village ordinance requiring
payment of up to three hundred and fifty dollars per lot from a
subdivider for educational facilities, declared that dedication or-
dinances cannot require a subdivider to assume the cost of public
improvements which were not "specifically and uniquely at-
tributable to his activity and which would otherwise be cast
upon the public." 20 ust as in Rosen, where the fees demanded
.4 Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 418, 88 A.2d 607, 613(1952).
15 "[I]f one is required to pay more than his share, he receives no cor-
responding benefit for the excess, and that may properly be styled extortion
or confiscation." Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 189 (1878).I6 E.g., Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561
(1957); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d
230 (1960); Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174,
368 P.2d 51 (1962); -augen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108(1961).
37 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E2d 799 (1961).
18 The amount of land was computed according to a formula provided
in the ordinance.
19 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E2d 230 (1960).20 Id. at 453, 167 N.E2d at 233-34.
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were held necessarily limited to costs specifically attributable to
the activity of the subdivider, so also in Pioneer Trust, the court
held that the exaction would constitute a "taking," since the need
for school facilities was a result of activity beyond the limits of
the subdivision. In elaborating upon permissible and prohibited
exactions, the opinion cited with approval the Ayres distinction
between the needs for improvements reasonably related to the
activity within the subdivision and those which "stem from the
total activity of the community." 21 The court also relied on
Rosen to observe that communities were not entitled to use the
requirement of plat approval to provide for every future problem
of the municipality.
In determining that the ordinance was unconstitutional, the
court made it clear that if the ordinance were properly restricted,
the dedication provisions would be valid. It was the abuse of
an appropriate control that made the ordinance unconstitutional.
While application of the ordinance could result in the subdivider
being burdened with the total cost of a definite need, under the
"specific and unique" formula, only a portion of the cost could be
reasonably attributed to the developer and ultimately to the
community's newcomers. This is in accord with the rationale
of the traditional cases seen earlier, for the subdivider would be
required to pay for only that portion of the facility necessitated
by his own activities. Therefore, it would seem that under the
Illinois approach, a more limited ordinance, demanding that the
municipality show a unique causal relation between the develop-
ment and the new facilities required, would be upheld.22
In Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh,23 the court
was confronted by a situation where the New York legislature
had empowered local communities to require land dedications or
cash in lieu of such dedications for parks, playgrounds or other
recreational purposes.24  The regulations adopted by the New-
burgh town board provided for dedication of land for park facilities
or, if dedication were impractical, for a deposit of fifty dollars
for each proposed lot in the subdivision. The moneys collected
21 Supra note 17, at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 802.22 In Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 194 Mont. 28,
394 P.2d 182 (1964), the court upheld a land dedication requirement
using the Pioneer Trust formula after finding a legislative determination
that subdivisions of certain sizes required new park facilities.
2325 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd mern.,
15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't- 1962).
24 "If the planning board determines that a suitable park or parks of
adequate size cannot be properly located in any such plat . . . the board
may require . . . an amount to be determined by the town board, which
amount shall be available for use by the town for neighborhood park,
playground or recreation purposes including the acquisition of property."
N.Y. Towiw LAw §277(1).
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were to be paid into a special fund for future acquisition and
improvement of the town's recreational facilities. The board
determined that the plaintiff's land was unsuited for parks and
conditioned approval of his subdivision upon payment of twenty-
three hundred dollars.
The appellate division, in a memorandum decision, affirmed
the supreme court's ruling that the enabling legislation was un-
constitutional. The supreme court had observed that the statute's
only limitation on the use of such exactions was the general provi-
sion that they be expended for neighborhood park or recreational
facilities. The moneys assessed could be used in any section of
the town and for any recreational purpose, regardless of any
relation to the contributing subdivision. This could result in the
subdivider, or the newcomer, paying more than a proportionate
share of the particular facility. In addition, the statute gave the
town board broad discretion to determine the amount of cash, if
any, to be paid in lieu of land.2 5  The court reasoned that such
discretionary authority could be discriminatorily applied.
The decision in Gulest reflects a different approach than
that in Pioneer Trust. While the Illinois court held the exaction
unconstitutional because there was no specific and unique causal
relationship between the development and the new facility, the
New York court declared the exaction unconstitutional because
the new facility, although necessitated by the subdivider, did not
directly benefit the subdivision.
Neither the Gulest nor the Pioneer Trust approach has de-
clared the land or cash requirements inherently unconstitutional.
Both opinions have merely attempted to refine the tests which
must be met for the exactions to be valid. Newcomers to a
community are thus protected from being taxed for the privilege of
entering the community.26
Land- Cash Exactions Held Constitutional
In two recent cases, ordinances requiring subdividers to
dedicate land for school and park use, or to pay a cash fee in
lieu of such dedication, were upheld. In Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls,2 7 an ordinance was enacted to apportion the cost
25 "The board may require . ..' Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
20A stronger stand in connection with schools was taken in Midtown
Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d
40 (1961), aff'd nier., 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (App. Div.
1963). "[A]ny attempt to compel a developer to pay for building a
school, or to donate land for a school, as a condition precedent to giving
. .. approval to a subdivision . . . is a taking of his property without
due process of law and deprives him of equal protection of the law,
and therefore is illegal and void." Id. at 210, 172 A.2d at 47.
2728 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
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of providing schools and parks "necessary to serve the additional
families brought into the community by subdivision development.
) ). 28 Subdividers were required either to dedicate land valued
at two hundred dollars per residential lot for parks and schools, or
to pay a sum equal to the value of the land. When a fee was
collected, forty per cent was allocated to a park fund and sixty
per cent to a school fund "to be used exclusively for immediate or
future site acquisition or capital improvement." 2D
The court, concluding that there was statutory authority for
the ordinance,30 analogized the land dedication requirements to the
more common requirements of dedicating land for streets, water
mains and sewers. Just as the municipalities could require land
for these common exactions, "similarly it would seem to follow
that the way to facilitate provision for schools, parks, and play-
grounds to serve the subdivision would be to require the sub-
divider to d&dicate a portion of the subdivision for such
purposes." 31
The court accepted the basic Pioneer Trust formula for de-
termining the constitutionality of such a requirement, but qualified
it with an original canon of application.
We deem this to be an acceptable statement of the yardstick to be
applied, provided the words 'specifically and uniquely attributable to
his activity' are not so restrictively applied as to cast an unreasonable
burden of proof upon the municipality. .... 32
Hence, although the municipality might not be able to prove that
the required land was to meet a need uniquely attributable to the
newcomers of a particular subdivision, it might more easily
provide a "reasonable basis" for the demand by establishing that
a group of subdivisions bad made the land dedications necessary. 33
Under this interpretation of the Pioneer Trust test, the unique
causal relation is reasonably demonstrated by a showing that the
municipality will be required to provide more land for schools
and parks as a result of the development.
28 Menomonee Falls Ordinance, as cited in Jordan v. Village of Meno-
monee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 610, 137 N.W.2d 442, 443 (1965).
9 Id. at 611, 137 N.W.2d at 444. The moneys allocated to the
school fund were further limited in that they could only be used "for the
benefit of the school district or districts in which the plat lies." Ibid.
3oWis. STAT. ANat. § 236.45(1) (1957). "The purposes of the statute
include facilitating 'adequate provision for transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks, playgrounds and other public requirements."' Jordan v.
Village of Menomonee Falls, mtpra note 28, at 613, 137 N.W2d at 446.31 Id. at 616, 137 N.W.2d at 446.
32 Id. at 617, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
33 However, a showing that sufficient lands for schools and parks had
been acquired prior to the opening up of the subdivisions or that, irrespec-
[ VoL.. 41
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The court disposed of the constitutional objections to the
equalization fee provision, stating that the same reasons which
prompted it to hold that the land dedication demands constituted a
reasonable exercise of the police power "apply with equal force
to the equalization fee requirement." 34 Statutory authority for
the cash provision was implied; such provision being necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the statute. If there were no alternative
to the land exactions, the subdivider would be relieved of any
obligation whenever land dedication was impractical.
In Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale,35 the New York Court
of Appeals considered an ordinance similar to that in the Jordan
case. The Court found sufficient authority for the land dedication
regulation in a statute permitting planning boards to require
that the subdivider show parks suitably located as a condition
precedent to approval of the plat.36 Although, as in Jordan,
there was no provision authorizing a cash in lieu of land exaction,
where the circumstances of a particular plat made the exaction
unprofitable, the planning board could waive the demand "subject
to appropriate conditions and guarantees. . . .," 37 This last
phrase was construed by the majority to include "the cash in lieu
of land" system Scarsdale had established.
Turning to the issue of constitutionality, the Court overruled
the so-called "New York test" stating:
Even if the Gulest decision were correct-and we hold it is not-
it would not apply here since by the Scarsdale rules and regulations
the moneys collected as 'in lieu' fees are not only put into a 'separate
fund . . .' but, as provided by the board of trustees, expenditures
from such fund are to be made only for 'acquisition and improvement
of recreation and park lands' in the village. There is nothing vague
about that language.38
The Court rejected the argument that the use of such moneys
for general village purposes amounted to an unconstitutional tax.
The majority found the exaction a "reasonable form of village
planning for the general community good," 39 reasoning that Scars-
dale would be forced to provide for the need if the subdivider
failed to do so. In addition, it is as reasonable to require the
tive of the newcomers, the normal growth of the municipality would have
necessitated the acquisition of land might prevent the establishment of a
reasonable basis. Id. at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 447-48
34 Id. at 620, 137 N.W.2d at 449.
30 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
36 N.Y. Vn.LAc LAw § 1794.
37 Ibid.3SJenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 84, 218 N.E.2d
673, 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957-58 (1966). (Emphasis added.)391d. at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
1967 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
subdivider to provide land for these facilities as to require land
for sewers, water mains and streets. Where, however, a sub-
division is not capable of providing lands, and the development
has increased the demand for more facilities, a reasonable solution
is to assess the subdivider to help meet the needs.
Difficulties Still Unresolved
Both the Jordan and the Jenad cases represent some departure
from prior decisions. Perhaps they also reflect a more realistic
approach to the problem of land development and the rise in
capital costs to a community. As has been stated concerning the
Jordan case:
Quite realistically, the focus was upon the result of subdivision activity
in general; the court properly recognized that the inability to trace
the problems of drastically increased population to the activity of any
one subdivider does not mean no subdivider has caused the problem.40
However, although the courts were sensitive to this fact, the ma-
jority opinions reflect an unrealistic approach in relation to other
problems to which the ordinances in question give rise.
The Tax Prolem
The most obvious difficulty is the manner in which the
appropriated funds are to be used. The dissents in both Jordan
and Jenad objected to the failure of the ordinances to provide
that the moneys collected be expended for the benefit of the
subdivision. The Jenad dissent reasoned that if the funds could
be used to provide recreation facilities for the municipality in
general, the exaction amounted to a tax and not an assessment.
As was stated in Stuart v. Palmer,41 concerning the power to tax,
"there must be an apportionment of the burdens, either among
all the property owners . . . or the property owners specially
40 66 CoLum. L. REv. 974, 979 (1966).
4174 N.Y. 183 (1878).
42Id. at 189.
43RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 29.2 (1957). See Norwood v. Baker,
172 U.S. 269 (1898).
44It should be made clear that municipalities cannot argue that the fee
is really an equalizing device in that the established residents have already
paid their fair share for facilities. The theory that the tax rate should
remain constant and the newcomers bear the burden of increased costs
"is so totally contrary to tax philosophy as to require it to be stricken
down. . . .' Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 23 N.J. 357, 362,
129 A.2d 265, 267 (1957).
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benefitted by the improvements." 4 2  In other words, the special
assessment is to be levied according to a proportionate share of
the cost of the improvement, "measured by its particular or
special benefit as distinguished from the general benefit accruing
throughout the municipality." 43 Thus, special assessments are
valid only when a special benefit flows to the party against whom
it is levied. The specific objection here is that the subdividers
or new residents are not guaranteed a particular benefit from
the levy for the parks and schools.
The Liberality of the Test
A further question arises concerning the tests for validity
adopted in the two cases. All that the municipality must estab-
lish is that the exaction is reasonably related to a need created
or aggravated by the new residents. As long as this relationship
is shown, a municipality could demand enormous equalization
fees. For example, the Jordan opinion mentions that in 1962,
an addition to a school in the vicinity of the plaintiff's subdivision
was completed at a cost of $364,000 while the value of land
dedicated and equalization fees collected for a four-year period
totaled only $127,000. Theoretically, applying the Pioneer Trust
test according to the Wisconsin reasoning, the municipality could
require a dedication or equalization fee equal to the total cost
of the improvement.44  Assuming that accurate estimates of
capital costs generated by development of a subdivision are avail-
able, is it permissible to require dedication, or equalization fees,
amounting to several thousand dollars per lot? The burden of this
exaction might sufficiently increase the cost of subdivision houses
so as to eliminate their market in a municipality.4 5 A wide-
spread adoption of such burdensome requirements could have
serious effects on an economy which requires a mobile population.46
Unnecessary difficulties, present in many recent cases, in-
cluding Jenad and Jordan, could be avoided by careful draftsman-
ship of the ordinances and statutes. Obviously, express statutory
authorization for an equalization fee exaction would eliminate the
contention that such fees are ultra vires. Even the tax argument
need not arise where cash is demanded, if the statute stipulates
that the moneys be spent on projects reasonably related to develop-
ment of the subdivision and the ordinance is drawn accordingly.
In addition, courts have declared that local governments may
4QNote that the Wisconsin enabling act includes" among its purposes
facilitating other public requirements. An application of the easily fulfilled
Jordan test to this general grant of power would result in the municipality
assessing new residents for any capital costs it chooses.
4G See S .umsox, Ecoxomics 612-43 (5th ed. 1962).
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not zone to prevent growth.47  Nor may municipalities zone for
the purpose of segregating residential areas by income level,4 s
or by race, religion or national origin.49 However, by means of
subdivision control, the municipality might achieve indirectly what
it is prohibited from doing directly. Thus, it appears imperative
that satisfactory legislation include a ceiling on the required fees,
well below the cost resulting from the particular land development.
A Proposed Method of Assessment
This leads directly to the question of an accurate method
of determining the capital costs newcomers generate by their
presence. One seemingly acceptable method is the modern cost
accounting technique. 50 This would "permit precise calculation
of costs for various facilities allocable to new subdivisions." 51
The proponents of this method correctly assert that the exaction
of fees in lieu of land dedication "is a more flexible device
and permits of equal application to all subdivisions regardless of
size." 52 This approach allows the exactions to be required of one
subdivision to be estimated in the context of, and in relation
to, other new subdivisions, established residents and future home
buyers.
Although the basic technique may be reliable, its proposed
application introduces another issue. Its advocates insist that
there is no justification for not applying the technique to all capital
costs, including, e.g., parks, schools, fire and police stations. They
anticipated the argument that such authority would allow local
politicians to prohibit real estate development maintaining that
"there are . . . political pressures that would prevent any state
legislature from permitting exactions to approach the constitutional
maximum." -3 According to this theory, any assessment would
be within constitutional limits, provided cost accounting techniques
could establish the relation between the exaction and the need
for which the assessment is made. This presumes, however,
that the majority of courts will ultimately conclude that a
4 Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942);
Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
Cf, Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167
N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
48 See Stein v. Long Branch, 2 N.J. Misc. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
49 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
5 Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality Of Imposing Increased
Community Costs On New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Ex-
actions, 73 YALE L.J. 1118, 1141-46 (1964).51Id. at 1143.52 Id. at 1142.
5 3 1d. at 1156. Necessarily included in these political pressures are con-
flicting state interests, e.g., mobile population and discrimination.
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subdivider can be required to dedicate land for parks, schools
and other capital needs. Although this position is concededly
arguable,5 4 and the cases which have met the issue squarely have
suggested that allowance of exactions for such purposes may
become the majority rule, it must be remembered that, at present,
few courts have faced the question. Moreover, a valid distinction
can be drawn between parks and other facilities. The traditional
exactions were generally related to the use and enjoyment of the
land by the newcomers.55 Since parks are more directly con-
nected with the use and enjoyment of land than schools and
police stations, the analogy between the traditional demands and
parks is more compelling.
This "use and enjoyment of land" distinction is directly re-
lated to the distinction between local benefit and general benefit
which is frequently used to determine whether an exaction is
constitutional. The law, although recognizing that an improve-
ment may incidentally benefit the community in general, has
insisted that it be local, viz., it must be primarily for the ac-
commodation of the assessed inhabitants.56 Whether a particular
improvement is local or general depends upon the nature of the
improvement, the surrounding conditions and the character of the
benefit.57 Whether cost accounting techniques may be applied to
all capital costs depends on how courts will ultimately regard
schools and police stations. There are policy questions at stake
which are well illustrated by using schools as an example. It
has been implied that public schools are traditionally considered
beneficial to the general public and must be financed completely
from a general tax base.55 The exactions above are seen as
challenging the American ideal of a free education system.
Conclusion
Not all of the policy questions arising from other capital
costs can be highlighted as in the case of schools. However,
the obvious point is that the exactions and the policies behind
them do and will continue to conflict with other important public
54 See Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality Of Imposing Increased
Community Costs 0; New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Ex'-
actions, 73 YALm L.J. 1118 (1964); Reps & Smith, Control of Urban
Land Subdivision, 14 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 405 (1963).55E.g., compare Lake Secor Dev. Co. v. Ruge, 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y.
Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931), with Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township
of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40 (1961), aff'd inein., 78 N.J.
Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1963) (dictum).
56 See 14 McQuru.IN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs § 38.113 (3d ed. 1950)
and cases cited therein.
57 Ibid.
58 Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, supra note 55.
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policies. It is unlikely that all the issues in the area will be
resolved within the foreseeable future. However, it seems inap-
propriate for state legislatures to permit these conflicts to find
resolution at town planning board meetings where local interests
are frequently given undue weight. The balancing of public
interests and the settling of conflicts of such importance presumably
deserve the close attention of the state legislatures.
M
THE JuvENILE OFFENDER'S PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN THE
NEw YORK FAmILY COURT
Should a child, when under the jurisdiction of a state juvenile
court, be afforded the constitutional rights guaranteed an adult in
ordinary criminal proceedings, i.e., the right to counsel, the right
against self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses and the
right to appeal? A recent Arizona case, Application of Gault,'
now pending before the United States Supreme Court, which is in
accord with numerous jurisdictions, has answered this question in
the negative. Several months ago, the United States Supreme
Court, in Kent v. United States,2 declared that the District of
Columbia's waiver proceeding, which determines whether ju-
risdiction will be entertained by either the criminal or juvenile
court, was unconstitutional. Thus, it appears that the Court is,
for the first time,3 attempting to deal with the constitutional problems
inherent in modem-day treatment of juvenile offenders. Whether
the Court will declare many state procedures to be in violation
of due process is a matter of great speculation.
In 1894, the New York legislature amended the Penal Code
to provide that a child under the age of fourteen, charged with
a felony which was not a capital offense, might, in the discretion of
the court, be tried for a misdemeanor.4 The charge was finally
reduced to juvenile delinquency as a matter of right,5 and, in 1922,
the children's courts were established throughout the state.6
Since the child was not to be convicted of a crime but only
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, an entirely novel proceeding was
created. The state's relation to the child was that of parens
199 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), prob. juris. noted, 384 U.S. 997
(1966).
2383 U.S. 541 (1966).
3 No United States Supreme Court decision has been found in this area,
nor does the Kent case refer to any Supreme Court case.4 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1894, ch. 726, § 1.
5 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1909, ch. 478, J 1.6 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1922, ch. 547, § 3.
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